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Abstract: In the past few years there had been numerous debates on the subject of 
2008’ RON speculative attack. This was leading to many articles and commentaries 
being written, by both academic specialists and banking experts, all of which focusing 
on 2008’ NBR’s monetary policies undertaken actions and their subsequent effects on 
the local money markets. However, none of these papers was answering to the basic 
questions  of  what,  how  and  why  really  happened  on  the  interbank  and  money 
exchange  markets  those  days.  We  will  be  emphasizing  herewith  some  insights  to 
these questions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
2008’  RON  speculative  attack  remains  a  hot  topic  in  the  Romanian  banking 
industry marketplace even today, after five years from the asserted instance. This is 
still  a  living  theme  these  days,  mainly  because  of  the  current  EUR/RON  volatile 
exchange rate behavior, which features enduring large swings over short time periods, 
similar to those of autumn 2008. 
During the last five years, a number of academic specialists and banking experts 
have  devoted  their  time  and  efforts  to  express  various  opinions  regarding  the 
particulars of that RON speculative attack, all of them focusing on debating the actions 
undertaken by National Bank of Romania’ (NBR) monetary policy market interventions 
and the effectiveness of their results, which have led in fact to even more debates.  
One of the most complex and complete study on this subject was carrying out by 
Lucian  Croitoru  (NBR  Governor’s  Adviser  on  monetary  policy)  in  April  2011  in  the 
article “Liquidity, speculative attack of October 2008 and the reputation of the Central 
Bank” Croitoru (2011). The article provides some important conclusions and remarks, 
inter-alia: 
 during  2004-2007:  Romania  has  experienced  large  foreign  capital  inflows; 
RON exchange rate against EUR have been rising by 24%, from 1EUR/4.1RON in 
January 2004 to 1EUR/3.1RON in July 2007; net purchases of foreign currency by 
Central Bank accounted for 48.5% of the foreign exchange reserve of the period; 
 during 2007-2008: RON started to depreciate gradually, from 3.1RON/1EUR 
in July 2007  the  exchange rate reached 3.73RON/1EUR  in  September 2008; there 
were noted a significant interbank system’ liquidity squeeze and liquidity deficit along 
with the acceleration of depreciation of RON exchange rate over a relatively short time-
period; in October 2008, the sales growth of RON-based swap contracts was very high 
in addition to a significant increase in the sales of RON on the currency market by non-
residents; the October 2008 increased currency operations are much higher than the 
maximum recorded in 2009-2010; in 2008, the actual RON exchange rate continued to 
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Central Bank has made foreign currency net sales in each of the four months; NBR 
has preferred to deal with the attack through the sale of foreign currency; 
 during  2009-2010:  during  January  2009,  RON’  depreciation  and  NBR’s 
accelerated net sales of foreign currency were even higher as those in October 2008, 
however  they  have  not  been  accompanied  by  a  high  volatility  of  interbank  interest 
rates;  during  January  2009,  RON  has  depreciated  from  4.03RON/1EUR  to 
4.3RON/1EUR, i.e. with 0.95% per trading day; in January 2009, RON had depreciated 
in real terms by 6% compared to December 2008 and 20.3% compared with July 2007; 
starting with 2009 it had been noted a significant decrease in foreign capital inflows; 
during  2008-2010  foreign  currency  net  sales  were  38.4%  of  the  NBR’s  foreign 
exchange  reserve  of  the  period;  most  foreign  currency  net  sales  exceeding  2%  of 
NBR’s foreign currency reserves were held in a total of 10 months in the period 2008-
2010; during 2008-2010 NBR have sold 83.7% of the total sales of foreign currency by 
the Central Bank from 1999 to 2010. 
Considering the aforementioned statements, we  will be emphasizing herewith 
the  insights and mechanics of global  investment and financing  practices, strategies 
and knowledge that have been leading to those consequences on Romanian market 
with respect to RON rates, local banking system and local real economy. We will not 
focus on NBR’s monetary policy actions and implications, but on elucidating the means 
of global financial markets developments whose aftershocks were clearly defined by 
the aforesaid conclusions. 
 
2.  2004-2008’ global macro outlook. The set up, unwinding and winding up 
of RON carry-trade 
 
Global  Macro  Investment  Strategies  are  a  particular  class  of  cross-border 
international investments carried out by the large-scale investment funds. These global 
macro strategies are targeting investments into world’s high-return countries, which in 
most cases are incidentally related to high-interest rate countries. During 2002-2007, 
JPY, CHF, USD and EUR relative low-yielding interest rates were making profitable to 
borrow  yen,  francs,  dollars  and  euros  to  fund  activities  in  high-yielding  currencies. 
These activities include investments and funding of global emerging and developing 
markets,  such  as  BRIC  countries,  the  new  EU-enlarged  countries  (former  Eastern 
European block), commodities and natural resources developing exporting countries 
(Turkey,  South  Africa,  Egypt,  etc),  Asian  emerging  countries  (Indonesia,  Thailand, 
Malaysia, etc). 
The global macro investors seek the highest returns possible provided that the 
investment seems to be sufficiently secure. Countries that offer the highest return on 
investment through high interest rates, economic growth and expansion in domestic 
financial markets tend to attract the most foreign capital inflows. Therefore, it is not just 
the interest rate itself that is important. The direction of the interest rate is acting as a 
good proxy for demand for the currency. High and increasing rates at the beginning of 
an economic expansion cycle can generate growth and value in a currency. On the 
other hand, low and lowering rates may indicate that a country is experiencing difficult 
economic conditions, which is reflected in a reduction of the currency’s value. Global 
macro investors are borrowing yen, francs, dollars and euros at low rates and they are 
using  these  proceeds  to  invest  in  higher-returns  global  markets  elsewhere.  Hence, 
falling low-yielding currencies were feeding up the global currency carry-trades, which 
mean  that  the  falling  yens,  francs,  dollars  and  euros  have  helped  provide  the 
significant  liquidity  that  has  fueled  the  global  emerging  and  developing  markets 
expansion in the pre-crisis years.  
Global fund managers are designing and implementing each and every cross-
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Currency  carry-trade  strategies  are  at  the  heart  of  any  cross-borders  investment 
decisions. Carry trades are not simply just exchange or interest rate arbitrages, they 
also have a significant temporal component. When global investors are proceeding to 
international investments programs, they are usually investing using leverage, meaning 
that they are investing borrowed capital in addition to their own funds. When leverage 
is used, the overall investment returns are much higher than in cases when investors 
are  using  only  own  capital  (equity  capital).  However,  this  remains  valid  only  if  the 
envisaged rate differentials conditions continue to be fulfilled. 
The global forex market is divided into three major currency groups based on the 
amount of daily trading activity and liquidity in each group. The market refers to these 
groups specifically as the major or reserve (USD; EUR; JPY; GBP; CHF), minor or 
commodity (AUD; CAD; NZD) and exotic or high-risk (BRL; MXN; THB; CNY; HKD; 
SGD; IDR; ZAR; RUB; INR; TRY; PLN; CZK; HUF; RON) currencies. 
Exotic (or emerging markets) currency pairs features some particulars:  
 they are not common in the global foreign exchange market;  
 they  are  usually  local  currencies  in  world’s  emerging  and  developing 
countries;  
 they have huge bid-ask spreads;  
 they are fully convertible, but their forex market is shallow;  
 they are mostly illiquid, they lack market depth and they trade at significantly 
low volumes, being thinly traded;  
 when experiencing fast price shifting, they are always facing excessive price 
volatility;  
 their  spot  rates  are  available,  but  the  forward  market  could  be  lacking, 
intermittent, or very expensive.  
All these characteristics is decoding that exotic currencies are carrying out the 
highest risk level. 
Another way to grasp the difference between major and exotic currencies (i.e. 
from  global  developed  and  emerging  markets/economies)  is  to  assess  the  central 
banks’ monetary policies via the benchmark interest rate guidelines. The tables below 
are featuring key interest rates policies between 2004 and 2009. (Table 1 and Table 2) 
As can be witnessed quite easily from these key interest rates evolution during 
2004-2008, Romania would be a perfect candidate for the global macro investments 
strategies, including RON  carry-trade setting up strategies. Furthermore, Romania’s 
economy  post-EU accession growth  prospective  would  be consistent  with the high-
returns host country profile for any global macro investors’ perspective. 
Hence, this is the fundamental underlying investment and economic layout that 
had made possible the significant Romania’s inflow of foreign capital and investments 
during 2004-2008. On average, the foreign capital inflows into Romania between 2004 
and 2008 were around EUR 16 billion per year.  
The main carrier for funding the liquidity for the entire foreign capital inflows was 
the RON carry-trade, which was carried against both USD and EUR. When entering 
into EUR/RON and USD/RON carry trade, the investors are borrowing in USD and 
EUR (by selling EUR and USD), converting the proceeds to RON (by buying RON) and 
investing in RON denominated assets. The RON-denominated assets are becoming 
thus the ones being carried. The RON denominated assets are covering any sort of 
asset classes that are potentially generating high-returns: local capital markets, local 
government debt securities, local real estate investments, export/import commodities 
transactions, and so forth.  
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Table 1. Major currencies key rates evolution during 2004-2009 
 
       United States          Euro Area        Japan                      Switzerland 
2004-06-30 1.25% 00              2000-06-09 4.25% 00 2001-03-20 0%  00 2006-09-14 1.75% 
2004-08-10 1.50%   2008-10-15 3.75%   2006-07-14 0.25%   2006-12-14 2.00% 
2004-09-21 1.75%   2008-11-12 3.25%   2007-02-21 0.50%   2007-03-15 2.25% 
2004-11-10 2.00%   2008-12-10 2.50%   2008-10-31 0.30%   2007-06-14 2.50% 
2004-12-14 2.25%   2009-01-21 2.00%   2010-10-05 0.10%   2007-09-13 2.75% 
2005-02-02 2.50%   2009-03-11 1.50%         2008-10-08 2.50% 
2005-03-22 2.75%   2009-04-08 1.25%         2008-11-06 2.00% 
2005-05-03 3.00%   2009-05-13 1.00%         2008-11-20 1.00% 
2005-06-30 3.25%               2008-12-11 0.50% 
2005-08-09 3.50%               2009-04-12 0.25% 
2005-09-20 3.75%                  
2005-11-01 4.00%                  
2005-12-13 4.25%                  
2006-01-31 4.50%                  
2006-03-28 4.75%                  
2006-05-10 5.00%                  
2006-06-29 5.25%                  
2007-01-02 5.25%                  
2007-09-18 4.75%                  
2007-10-31 4.50%                  
2007-12-11 4.25%                  
2008-01-22 3.50%                  
2008-01-30 3.00%                  
2008-03-18 2.25%                  
2008-04-30 2.00%                  
2008-10-08 1.50%                  
2008-10-29 1.00%                  
2008-12-16 0%                   
Source:  Bloomberg  (http://www.bloomberg.com),  Thomson  Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com) 
 
Table 2. Exotic currencies (former European Eastern block only) key rates evolution 
during 2004-2009 
 
          Hungary       Czech Rep.            Poland           Romania 
2004-03-23 12.25% 00 2004-06-25 2.25% 00 2004-07-01 5.75% 00 2004-06-07 20.75% 
2004-04-06 12.00%   2004-08-27 2.50%   2004-07-29 6.00%   2004-07-12 20.00% 
2004-05-04 11.50%   2005-01-28 2.25%   2004-08-26 6.50%   2004-08-05 19.25% 
2004-08-17 11.00%   2005-04-01 2.00%   2005-03-31 6.00%   2004-08-27 18.75% 
2004-10-19 10.50%   2005-04-29 1.75%   2005-04-28 5.50%   2004-11-02 18.25% 
2004-11-23 10.00%   2005-10-31 2.00%   2005-06-30 5.00%   2004-11-22 17.75% Year  XIII, No. 15/2013                                                                                             197 
2004-12-21 9.50%    2006-07-28 2.25%   2005-07-28 4.75%   2004-12-20 17.00% 
2005-01-25 9.00%    2006-09-29 2.50%   2005-09-01 4.50%   2005-01-17 16.50% 
2005-02-22 8.25%    2007-06-01 2.75%   2006-02-01 4.25%   2005-02-14 15.75% 
2005-03-30 7.75%    2007-07-27 3.00%   2006-03-01 4.00%   2005-03-14 14.50% 
2005-04-26 7.50%    2007-08-31 3.25%   2007-04-26 4.25%   2005-04-11 12.50% 
2005-05-24 7.25%    2007-11-30 3.50%   2007-06-28 4.50%   2005-08-09 8.50% 
2005-06-21 7.00%    2008-02-08 3.75%   2007-08-30 4.75%   2005-09-22 7.50% 
2005-07-19 6.75%    2008-08-08 3.50%   2007-11-29 5.00%   2006-02-09 8.50% 
2005-08-23 6.25%    2008-11-07 2.75%   2008-01-31 5.25%   2006-06-28 8.75% 
2005-09-20 6.00%    2008-12-18 2.25%   2008-02-28 5.50%   2007-02-12 8.00% 
2006-06-20 6.25%    2009-02-06 1.75%   2008-03-27 5.75%   2007-03-27 7.50% 
2006-07-25 6.75%    2009-05-11 1.50%   2008-06-26 6.00%   2007-05-03 7.25% 
2006-08-29 7.25%    2009-08-07 1.25%   2008-11-27 5.75%   2007-06-26 7.00% 
2006-09-26 7.75%    2009-12-17 1.00%   2008-12-24 5.00%   2007-08-01 7.00% 
2006-10-25 8.00%    2010-05-07 0.75%   2009-01-28 4.25%   2007-11-01 7.50% 
2007-06-26 7.75%          2009-02-26 4.00%   2008-01-08 8.00% 
2007-09-25 7.50%          2009-03-26 3.75%   2008-02-04 9.00% 
2008-04-01 8.00%          2009-06-25 3.50%   2008-03-26 9.50% 
2008-04-29 8.25%                2008-05-07 9.75% 
2008-05-27 8.50%                2008-06-27 10.00% 
2008-10-22 11.50%               2008-08-01 10.25% 
2008-11-25 11.00%               2009-02-05 10.00% 
2008-12-09 10.50%               2009-05-07 9.50% 
2008-12-23 10.00%               2009-07-01 9.00% 
2009-01-20 9.50%                2009-08-05 8.50% 
2009-07-28 8.50%                2009-09-30 8.00% 
2009-08-25 8.00%                2010-01-06 7.50% 
2009-09-29 7.50%                2010-02-04 7.00% 
2009-10-20 7.00%                2010-03-30 6.50% 
2009-11-24 6.50%                2010-05-05 6.25% 
2009-12-22 6.25%                   
2010-01-26 6.00%                   
2010-02-23 5.75%                   
2010-03-30 5.50%                   
2010-04-27 5.25%                   
2010-11-30 5.50%                   
2010-12-21 5.75%                   
Source:  Bloomberg  (http://www.bloomberg.com),  Thomson  Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com) 
 
However, what is making the exotic RON currency carry-trade so unique is the 
fact that global fund managers investing in the Romanian market are practically able to 
secure  virtually  unlimited  funding  and  capital  cash-flows  by  simply  shorting  (and 
borrowing thus at the lowest costs) the two of the world’s core-reserve currencies, the 
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captures both the interest rates differential as well as the exchange rates differential 
between  the  low-yielding  and  high-yielding  currencies.  From  the  carry-trade 
perspective,  this  structure  remains  profitable  as  long  as  EUR/RON  and  USD/RON 
exchange  rates  do  not  shift  significantly,  meaning  that  the  investment  strategy  is 
profitable as long as the interest rate differentials are higher than RON exchange rate 
depreciations against euro and dollar. By this means, RON has become the stronger 
currency against both EUR and USD during 2004-2008. (Chart 1) 
 
 
 
Chart 1. Exchange rates evolution (weekly chart) from Jan 01, 2004 to Jan 01, 2008 
Source: Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com), Thomson Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com), National Bank of Romania (http://www.bnro.ro) 
 
This  entire  investment  process  is  actually  behind  the  strong  bull  Romanian 
financial markets and economic growth between 2004 and 2008. These facts would 
also lead to answer to conclusions regarding 2004-2007 period from the introductory 
part.  
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the very same guiding principles and 
course  of  actions  had  led  to  foreign  investments  and  capital  inflows  to  the  rest  of 
countries  from  former  European  Eastern  block  during  2004-2008  (and  on  a  wider 
extent,  the  exact  same  investment  guidelines  and  actions  were  equally  applied  in 
connection with the investments to the rest of emerging and developing countries in 
Asia, Africa and the rest  of the  world). In other  words, global investments into this 
region were all part of the same plan and all came as part of a single interconnected 
and  interlinked  developed  countries  foreign  capital  opening  out  to  the  newest 
European emerging markets in search for new growth catalysts. 
Due  to  the  very  complex  nature  and  intricate  mechanics  of  global  macro 
investment strategies into the world emerging markets and developing economies, this 
sort of cross-border ventures are meant to span for a long time. It needs a great deal of 
negative and damaging fundamentals to take place such that global macro investors 
relinquish their worldwide investment engagements. In spite of this, the outbreak of the 
international financial crisis in July 2007 and its subsequent depressing actions had 
been  proven  a  crucial  milestone  in  the  modern  global  financial  markets  and 
international investments ecosystem. Its forceful and overwhelming behavior had led 
financial markets and global investors to reconsider and reshape their entire short-term 
and long-term investment strategies and business actions. 
During  the  global  bull  market  era,  the  riskier  and  higher-yielding  emerging 
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dollars and euros have financed much of the buying of those riskier assets. A trend 
reversal in any of these four major currencies would be putting the emerging markets 
expansion  in jeopardy  and it should  be  noticed as an early sign that  the period of 
emerging markets leadership is ending. It should also be suggesting that investors are 
turning more risk-averse when investing on the global markets and economies. 
Starting with July 2007, numerous global macro investors have adjusted their 
investment  actions  to  adapt  the  global  ventures  to  the  new  global  macro  financial 
framework.  The  first  actions  they  have  taken  were  to  start  deleveraging  their 
investments and to start exiting from the high-risk markets and transactions they were 
currently being involved at that time. At the outset, this would be implying, inter-alia:  
 dumping  the  high-yield/high-risk  profile  global  investments  and  financial 
instruments; 
 deleveraging their current financing and investment endeavors;  
 unwinding exotic currency carry-trades;  
 trimming down  emerging  markets exposures (marking the  profits or cutting 
short the losses);  
 repositioning to their core/developed global markets;  
 focusing  on  low-yielding/low-risk  but  secure  investments  and  markets  in  a 
global risk-averse investments approach.  
As a result, the first losers of this new global macro environment were the world 
emerging markets and developing countries. When unwinding, and finally winding-up, 
currency  carry-trades,  the  biggest  losers  are  the  higher-yielding  currencies  and  the 
riskiest assets, such as RON and RON-based assets. On the other hand, the falling of 
the exotic foreign currencies is signaling weakness in their respective economies and 
financial markets. Thus, the emerging and developing markets have started witnessing 
straight  away  the  outcomes  of  this  shift  in  the  global  investment  strategies:  selling 
pressure  on  the  local  currency  denominated  assets;  foreign  capital  outflows;  local 
currencies depreciations; local asset prices depreciations and so forth.  
The fall of Lehman Brothers on Sep 15, 2008 was the major trigger of the global 
financial  collapse  that  followed.  That  occurrence  had  been  leading  to  a  global 
meltdown  that  was  actually  accelerating  the  changing  landscape  described  above, 
making things to happen much faster and more abrupt than initially anticipated. 
Throughout  the  foreign  currency  boom  from  2002  to  2007,  the  yen,  francs, 
dollars  and  euros  were  the  world's  weakest  foreign  currencies  compared  to  the 
emerging countries high-yielding local currencies. However, starting with 2007-2008, 
those trends have reversed as risk-averse global investors have abandoned the exotic 
higher-yielding currencies and favoring the lower-yielding but secure major currencies. 
During 2004-2007, the Romanian economy was looking a lot stronger as long as RON-
denominated assets were being financed by weak euros and dollars. Following July 
2007, with these major currencies being no longer so cheap, Romanian assets had 
been starting to look a lot weaker. Starting with July 2007, Romanian financial market 
and  real  economy  have  witnessed  ruthless  foreign  capital  outflows  and  foreign 
investors’  exodus,  in  line  with  the  rest  of  emerging  markets  worldwide.  The  first 
indications  of  this  new  macro  background  had  been  seen  on  the  local  financial 
markets, foreign exchange, banking and stock markets. Moreover, it all started with the 
RON carry-trade, again. 
Hence,  beginning  with  July  2007,  global  macro  investors  had  started  to 
deleverage their Romanian based investments. This could be done only via unwinding 
the RON carry-trade. Unwinding RON carry-trade is actually  performed by covering 
euro and dollars shorts by selling RON-denominated assets, which makes the dollars 
and  euros  to  start  rising  against  RON.  In  turn,  the  EUR  and  USD  upturns  would 
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and  economy  growth.  This  is  because  of  the  negative  correlation  between  RON-
denominated assets prices and EUR & USD exchange rates against RON.  
Between  July  2007  and  September  2008,  there  were  a  moderate  upturn  in 
dollars and euros against RON, which were signaling that the RON carry-trade started 
to unwind. Global macro investors were being forced to start selling RON-denominated 
assets in order to pay back their dollar and euro overseas loans (covering their USD 
and EUR shorts). It can be easily noted that the rise in EUR and USD against RON 
from that period had coincided with the beginning of the medium-term plunge in RON-
denominated  assets  prices  (currency,  stock  market,  real  estates,  and  so  forth). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that once the USD/RON and EUR/RON trend reversals 
are  starting  to  shape  out,  RON  would  be  transitioning  from  one  of  the  strongest 
currencies  to  one  of  the  weakest.  Whereas  that  trend  reversal  continues  and 
strengthens,  the  RON  unwinding  carry-trade  would  become  a  winding-up  process, 
which will finally stop carrying the Romanian bull market. 
In fact, starting with September 2008, RON carry-trade unwinding process has 
accelerated and it became much stronger, which was pushing the RON depreciation 
even deeper and faster than before. There are three transactions involved herein. First, 
the investors would borrow dollars and euros. Second, these funds would be converted 
into RON. Third, the proceeds would be used to buy assets denominated in the new 
currency. The same three transactions are performed in reverse to unwind and wind-
up  the  RON  carry-trade.  First,  investors  must  sell  their  RON  denominated  assets. 
Second, they must convert the proceeds back into dollars and euros by buying USD 
and  EUR.  Third,  they  must  pay  back  the  borrowed  money.  This  puts  downward 
pressure  on  the  RON-denominated  assets  prices  that  were  bought  with  borrowed 
dollars and euros and upward pressure on the USD and EUR as funds are repatriated. 
Following  the  fall  of  Lehman  Brothers  on  Sep  15,  2008,  RON-denominated 
assets’ sell-off made stronger, which caused sharp declines in their prices. Thus, RON 
depreciation  against  all  four  major  currencies  has  exponentially  accelerated.  RON 
carry-trade unwinding had actually become a winding-up process, which had lasted 
during 2009 and 2010. It had been associated with massive foreign capital outflows; 
further  investment  and  financing  deleveraging;  increased  foreign  investors  seeping 
away; additional steep RON-denominated assets’ prices decline. As a matter of fact, 
RON depreciation had continued at a more moderate but constant pace starting with 
2011  up  to  2013  due  to  constant  and  widespread  investment  and  financing 
deleveraging, steady foreign capital outflows, lackluster foreign capital inflows, to name 
only a few. These facts would also lead to partially answer to conclusions regarding 
2007-2008 and 2009-2010 periods from the introductory part. (Chart 2 and Chart 3) 
 
3.  NBR’s monetary policy implications 
 
Central  Banks  interventions  are  based  on  mean-reversion  principles.  Central 
banks often intervene when the currency severely deviates from the mean. The main 
central  banks  argument  is  the  overshooting  model.  During  speculative  attacks, 
currencies  can  get  into  strongly  overvalued  or  undervalued  territory.  Thus,  it  is 
assumed that central banks, which are trying to minimize fluctuations in their currency 
exchange rates, are behaving like pure speculators when intervening. As a result, they 
tend to buy local currency and sell foreign currency when the exchange rate is low (to 
support  the  local  currency)  and  conversely,  to  sell  local  currency  and  buy  foreign 
currency  when  the  exchange  rate  is  high  (to  depreciate  the  local  currency).  This 
combination  of  “buying  low  and  selling  high”  implies  that,  if  the  central  banks  are 
succeeding in stabilizing their currencies exchange rates, this actually means that their 
monetary policies interventions have been successful. 
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Chart 2. Exchange rates evolution (weekly chart) from Jul 01, 2007 to Nov 30, 2008 
Source: Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com), Thomson Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com), National Bank of Romania (http://www.bnro.ro) 
 
 
 
Chart 3. Exchange rates evolution (weekly chart) from Jul 01, 2007 to Oct 27, 2013 
Source: Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com), Thomson Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com), National Bank of Romania (http://www.bnro.ro) 
 
NBR’s  current  monetary  policy  guiding  principles  (managed  float  currency 
regime) are in fact positioning RON as an enduring low-volatility currency within the 
global foreign exchange markets. This is actually preserving the overweight interest 
rate differential against EUR and USD, which in turn is encouraging and is keeping 
alive  the  long-term  RON  carry-trade  investment  appetite.  Noteworthy,  the  risks 
involved  in  a  currency  carry-trade  are  related  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  high-yield 
currency  exchange  rate’  future  developments,  in  our  case  this  refers  to  the  lasting 
outlook of RON’s appreciation or depreciation expectations. Consequently, considering 
the  existing  RON  currency  characteristics  (interest  rate  differentials  profile  and 
currency  volatility  lookout),  dealing  RON  against  EUR  and  USD  in  the  global  forex 
markets makes RON to fall precisely into the exotic currency group of high-interest rate 
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The  global  currencies  carry-trades  reversed  sharply  in  2007-2008  as  global 
interest rate differentials narrowed, causing the low-yielding currencies to rally against 
high-yielding  currencies.  When  unwinding  currency  carry-trades  timing  is  of  the 
essence.  Any  small  exchange  rate  shifting  of  the  low-yielding  currency  could  be 
generating significant  losses to  the overall investment returns. In other  words, high 
exchange  rate  volatility  of  the  currencies  involved  in  the  carry-trade  is  calling 
automatically  for  unwinding  of  the  carry-trade.  Unwinding  high-yielding  carry-trades 
was a global process during 2007-2009 and after, which had been equally curtailing all 
global emerging markets and developing countries currencies, not just RON. In other 
words, all high-yielding currencies around the globe have been depreciating during this 
period. (Chart 4 and Chart 5) 
There are substantial evidence, in global finance and macroeconomics behavior, 
that larger markets and developed economies have more immunity to the disruptive 
aspects of the currencies carry-trades, mainly due to the sheer quantity of their existing 
currencies compared to the amount used for foreign exchange carry-trades, whereas 
the collapse of any currency carry trade is often associated with a rapid appreciation of 
the  low-yielding  currency.  As  the  low-yielding  currency  starts  appreciating,  there  is 
pressure to cover any  debts in that currency  by converting foreign assets  into that 
currency. This cycle will have an accelerating effect on currency valuation changes. 
When a large swing occurs, this causes a carry-trade reversal, referred as carry-trade 
unwinding. The timing of the global unwinding of currencies carry-trades in 2007-2008 
contributed substantially to the global credit crunch, which in turn deepened the 2008 
global financial crisis. 
Within the global forex markets RON is acting as an exotic currency, and thus it 
is featuring the entire set of aforesaid shortcoming and drawback emerging markets 
currencies’ particulars. Hence, RON’s shallow forex market had virtually collapsed at 
the time when the hefty long-term RON carry-trade started wide spreading to unwind. 
Investors hustle to cover their euros and dollars shorts by massively selling RON and 
buying  EUR  and  USD,  focusing  on  securing  the  most  favorable  EUR/RON  and 
USD/RON  exchange  rates  by  means  of  either  spot  markets  or  derivatives  (RON 
swaps).  Thus,  RON’  low-volumes  thinly  traded  forex  market, mostly  illiquid,  lacking 
spot  and  forward  market  depth  had  been  crashed  under  this  unwinding  pressure. 
Consequently, RON had been trading at huge bid-ask spreads, facing excessive price 
volatility and experiencing fast price shifting. Ultimately, all these RON forex market 
deficiencies had been distorting the interbank market, triggering liquidity squeeze and 
weighing over the interest and exchange rates markets.  
Romanian  interbank liquidity  shortage  were  determined mainly by the  lack of 
more than a few strong local, and especially, overseas eligible trading counterparties 
with that to manage this kind of crises. The only real major eligible counterparties to 
trade RON forex with (forward contracts, swaps, etc) and exchange (buy/sell) RON 
currency were just a few major local-based banks. In these circumstances, Oct-Nov 
2008’ interbank liquidity shortfall and the subsequent jump in interbank interest rates, 
have led to RON being traded via foreign exchange swaps at the implied oversized 
local currency yields. Consequently, NBR’s market operations carried out during those 
days, acting as last resort forex trader (foreign exchange currencies seller), lender and 
eligible  counterparty,  had  been  meant  to  curtail  those  atypical  forex  and  interbank 
actions. However, due to the sizable RON carry-trade unwinding process started in 
July 2007 and its particularly step up nature during 2008 – 2010, NBR’s forex market 
interventions had been unable to curb RON accelerated depreciation and have failed 
to contain the upsurge in the interbank interest rates, which had been continuing to 
push higher and remained challenging over the key interest rate during 2007-2010.  
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Chart 4. Exchange rates evolution (weekly chart) from Jul 01, 2007 to Jul 01, 2009 
Source: Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com), Thomson Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com) 
 
 
 
Chart 5. Exchange rates evolution (weekly chart) from Jul 01, 2007 to Jul 01, 2009 
Source: Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com), Thomson Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com) 
 
Furthermore,  interbank  liquidity  scarcity  and  the  subsequent  jump  in  the 
interbank interest rates were actually inherent in the market since October 2007 and 
the interbank interest rates were rising and breaking well above key interest rate during 
October-December 2007 (around 8-8.5% p.a.), April-December 2008 (ranging between 
10% p.a. and 18% p.a.) and January-December 2009 (between 10% p.a. and 15% 
p.a.). These facts would also lead to fully answer to conclusions regarding 2007-2008 
and 2009-2010 periods from the introductory part. (Chart 6) 
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Chart 6. NBR’s key interest rate vs. interbank interest rate from Jan 01, 2007 to Jan 
01, 2011 
Source: Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com), Thomson Reuters 
(http://www.thomsonreuters.com), National Bank of Romania (http://www.bnro.ro) 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Currency carry-trades and leveraging techniques are the backbones of any global 
macro investment strategies. Romanian financial market’s expansion and contraction; 
Romanian  economy’s  growth  and  decline;  RON  currency’s  appreciation  and 
depreciation cycles are not just autonomous and standalone occurrences. They are all 
part  of  a  global  macro  investment  ecosystem  and  they  are  all  interconnected  and 
interlinked  with  the  rest  of  emerging  markets  and  developing  economies  course  of 
actions. 
Without ruling out the likelihood of a RON speculative attack during Oct 17 - Nov 5, 
2008, we have thoroughly emphasized herein that the impact of speculatively shorting 
RON on the background of the massive deleveraging and RON carry-trade unwinding 
processes taking place during that period, would have been similar to only a drop in 
the ocean from Romanian foreign exchange and interbank markets perspective.  
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